


UNCLASSIFIED

**1ST CAVALRY DIVISION
(AIRMOBILE)**



UNCLASSIFIED

REGRADED _____ BY AUTHORITY

OF AR 340-17

BY RAKERS ON 1/25/88

**OPERATION
CRAZY HORSE**

16 MAY - 5 JUNE 1966

**BINH DINH PROVINCE
REPUBLIC *of* VIETNAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco 96490

10 September 1966

AVDAGT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96243

1. IDENTITY AND TYPE OF OPERATION. Operation CRAZY HORSE. An attack to relieve forces in contact followed by a search and destroy operation.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. 161045 May - 052400 Jun 66.
3. LOCATION. The division area of operations (AO) was located in the Vinh Thanh Valley, Binh Dinh Province. The area was bounded by National Highway 1 on the east, grid line 47 on the south, grid line 50 on the west and grid line 90 on the north. (Refer to Inclosure L)
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
5. REPORTING OFFICER. a. Principal 1st Cavalry Division commanders and senior staff officers participating in Operation CRAZY HORSE were:

Major General John Norton	Division Commander
Brigadier General John M. Wright Jr.	Asst Division Commander
Colonel William A. Becker	Asst Division Commander
Colonel George S. Beatty Jr.	Chief of Staff
Colonel John J. Hennessey	CO, 1st Brigade (Airborne)
Colonel William F. Brand	CO, Division Artillery
Colonel Allen M. Burdett Jr.	CO, 11th Aviation Group
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Silver	CO, Support Command
Lieutenant Colonel James C. Smith	CO, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Malley	CO, 8th Engineer Battalion
Lieutenant Colonel Paul N. Simon	CO, 13th Signal Battalion
Lieutenant Colonel John D. White	ACofS, G1
Lieutenant Colonel Bobby R. Lang	ACofS, G2
Lieutenant Colonel Earl K. Buchan	ACofS, G3

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Lieutenant Colonel Robert E Spiller ACOFS, G4
Lieutenant Colonel James L. Kirkpatrick ACOFS, G5

b. Principal commanders of non-organic units participating in Operation CRAZY HORSE under control or in support of the 1st Cavalry Division included:

Lieutenant Colonel Kim CO, 2d Battalion, Cavalry Regiment,
BCK Capitol Infantry Division
Major Raymond L. George USSF, Detachment, Vinh Thanh

6. TASK ORGANIZATION. a. Detachments. No organic units were detached from the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation CRAZY HORSE. Organic units were placed under OCA to adjacent units for the periods indicated:

(1) A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav: OCA 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 16 May - 5 Jun 66.

(2) A Company, 2d Bn, 5th Cav: OCA 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 25 May - 29 May 66.

(3) 2d Bn, 5th Cav: OCA 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 29 - 30 May 66.

(4) 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div with 2/12th Cav and normal supporting troops: OCA to 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div from 1 - 5 Jun 66.

b. Major non-organic units attached to this division remained unchanged during CRAZY HORSE. Units remaining attached included:

(1) 3d Bn, 18th Arty (8"/155mm/175mm SP).

(2) 2d Bn, 17th Arty (105mm Towed).

(3) Btry B, 29th Arty (Searchlight).

(4) 478th Aviation Company (CH-54).

(5) 17th Aviation Company (CV-2).

(6) 191st MI Detachment.

c. The 10th RRU continued under operational control authority of this division during CRAZY HORSE.

d. The 2d Bn, 1st Cav Regt (CRID) was under OCA, 1st Cavalry Division from 281200 May to 051200 June 1966.

e. Task Force Bravo, 22d ARVN Division was under OCA, 1st Cavalry Division from 28 May to 1 June 1966.

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f. Four CIDG companies were under OCA 1st Cavalry Division from 26 - 31 May 1966.

g. Division Task Organization during CRAZY HORSE was:

1st Brigade

1st Bn, 12th Cav	Water Point, 8th Engr Bn
1st Bn, 8th Cav (16 May, 20 May - 5 Jun)	Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (17 - 19 May)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (16 May, 18 May - 5 Jun)	1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) (19 - 31 May)
1st Bn, 5th Cav (16 - 30 May)	A Co, 8th Engr Bn
2d Bn, 12th Cav (17 - 19 May)	Plat (-), 545th MP Co
TF Bravo (22d ARVN Div) (28 May - 5 Jun)	Sig Spt Team, 13th Sig Bn
2d Bn, 1st Cav Regt CRID (28 May - 5 Jun)	Tm 1, IPW/CI Tm, 191st MI Det
CIDG - 4 Companies (26 - 31 May)	Tm 1, 10th RRU
Forward Spt Element (Spt)	Tm 1, 16th Weather Sqdn

2d Brigade

2d Bn, 7th Cav (16 - 24 May)
2d Bn, 5th Cav (16 - 19 May, 1 - 5 Jun)
2d Bn, 12th Cav (23 May - 5 Jun)
1st Bn, 5th Cav (31 May - 1 Jun)

Division Troops

1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-), (16 - 19 May)
1st Bn, 5th Cav (1 - 5 Jun)

Division Artillery

2d Bn, 19th Arty (-), (16 May - 5 Jun)
2d Bn, 17th Arty (-), (16 May - 5 Jun)
3d Bn, 18th Arty (19 May - 5 Jun)
2d Bn, 29th Arty (16 May - 5 Jun)
C Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (19 May - 5 Jun)
B Btry, 29th Arty (16 May - 5 Jun)
E Btry, 82d Arty (16 May - 5 Jun)

3d Brigade

2d Bn, 5th Cav (19 - 29 May)
1st Bn, 8th Cav (17 - 19 May)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (17 May)
2d Bn, 7th Cav (24 May - 5 Jun)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-), (1 Jun - 5 Jun)
2d Bn, 12th Cav (20 May - 23 May)

7. SUPPORTING FORCES. a. USAF Tac Air. Tac Air support for CRAZY HORSE was requested through DASC ALFA (Nha Trang). Preplanned mission requests were submitted by Army phone communications. Immediate requests were submitted by USAF radio. A total of 260 fighter sorties, three ARC LIGHT missions (21 sorties) and six illumination missions were employed in support of Operation CRAZY HORSE. (Refer to paragraph 7a, Inclosure 1)

b. USSF B, 22d Detachment, Vinh Thanh Valley coordinated participation of USSF/CIDG units from the Vinh Thanh Valley USSF camp with the division during Operation CRAZY HORSE. (Refer to paragraph 6)

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8. INTELLIGENCE. a. Background. On 10 May, CIDG elements captured a member of D-26 Local Force Company. At 151130 May a CIDG platoon ambushed a VC platoon and captured a 120mm mortar firing table, a Chicom mortar sight, a gunner's quadrant, and a compass capable of measuring vertical angles and map distances. Documents captured indicated the possibility of an attack on the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp on 19 May (Ho Chi Minh's birthday). On 16 May, Co B, 2d Bn, 8th Cav was airlifted to BR 672629. Contact was made with at least two companies and during the night of 16-17 May our forces were increased to Battalion (-). Sporadic contacts continued on 17 May with an estimated regiment in the vicinity of Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp. Analysis of captured documents indicated division units were engaged with the 2d VC Regiment reinforced by C14 Company, 32d Artillery Battalion. On 18 May, the 1st Brigade was committed. Small contacts continued throughout the AO; the enemy was tenacious and aggressive. Operation DAVY CROCKETT conducted northeast of the AO (4 - 16 May) may have diverted portions of the enemy forces into the Vinh Thanh Valley.

b. Terrain and Weather:

(1) General. The CRAZY HORSE AO covers approximately 1600 square kilometers. From a minimum altitude of 200 feet in the Vinh Thanh Valley, the altitude increases rapidly to 3000 feet in the center peaks. Dense vegetation with a high canopy with second and third growths underneath cover the mountains. Ground mobility is extremely difficult in the mountains except along the numerous intermittent streams running east into the Suoi Ca Valley and west into the Vinh Thanh Valley. In the center of the AO, the mountains rise sharply from the stream beds and sheer cliffs are prevalent. In the Vinh Thanh and Suoi Ca Valley, and along the eastern portion of the AO, the terrain is composed of flat level rice paddies.

(2) Observation and field of fire. In the valleys, observation varied from fair to excellent limited only by crops and variations of relief. Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are generally good. In the mountains and jungle areas, fields of fire were generally poor. In the jungle areas, observation on both the ground and in the air was poor. Observation in the valleys was generally good to excellent.

(3) Cover and concealment. In the river valleys, cover was scattered; concealment was provided by crops and scattered small forest areas. The mountainous area provides good cover with its numerous valleys, gullies and sharply dissected terrain. The heavy canopy, thick vegetation and irregular terrain in the mountains provides good concealment.

(4) Obstacles. Streams and rivers in the area are generally fordable at selected points. The road leading up the Vinh Thanh Valley was passable, some bridges had been destroyed but by-passes had been constructed. In the mountains, sheer cliffs and steep valley walls constituted a barrier to foot movement, as did dense jungle. While these are no obstacles to airmobile operations, the density of forests presented a problem in construction and selection of landing zones.

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(5) Key terrain features. Because of the vastness of the AO and the employment of airmobile operations, no particular terrain feature is considered to be key.

(6) Weather. In general the weather favored airmobile operations. Sky conditions were clear except in late afternoons when thunderstorms limited visibility. Temperatures varied from 80 to 98 degrees.

c. Order of battle information at the outset of the operation was sketchy and incomplete.

(1) Committed Forces:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
2d VC Regiment	1800	Confirmed
C14 Co, 32d Artillery Bn	30-40	Confirmed
1 Platoon, D26 LF Co	20-30	Confirmed

(2) Reinforcements:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
E210 Battalion	400	Possible

d. Significant intelligence results of Operation CRAZY HORSE are summarized as follows:

(1) Seventy-five linear inches of documents were captured on this operation. These documents disclosed the VC infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province. Rosters, code names and designations of military and political units were uncovered.

(2) Extensive fortifications and military installations were discovered during the operation. Rice sufficient to feed over 22,000 soldiers two months (two pounds per soldier per day) was destroyed or evacuated. On 27 May, a fifty bed hospital was destroyed along with the medical supplies discovered therein. Installations, caches, way-stations and medical facilities uncovered would be capable of supporting a division size organization for a minimum of sixty days.

(3) Intelligence, produced prior to and during the operation, indicated likely targets for the 1st Cavalry Division. Rapid interchange of information between Free World Forces insured quick response to situations as they developed.

e. Order of battle developed the following enemy units during and after the operation:

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CONFIRMED

14th Co, 32d Arty (120mm
Mtr)
2d VC Regt

703d Sapper Co
300th Guerrilla Co
Section IV, Binh Khe District
Co D26 (-), Local Force

PROBABLE

B210 MF Bn

A 30 Scty Soc Binh
Dinh
District

POSSIBLE

8th Bn (-), 22d NVA Regt
9th Bn (-), 22d NVA Regt
6th Bn, 12th NVA Regt

9. MISSION. The division mission for Operation CRAZY HORSE, with the concurrence of I FFORCEV, was stated in 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) OPORD 6617 as "Division continues the attack to destroy enemy forces in the vicinity of the Vinh Thanh Valley (BR 6160); conducts offensive operations in vicinity of Division TAOR; conducts tactical route security on Highway 19 from BR 625471 to Pleiku City; and maintains a battalion TF reaction force for I FFORCEV and division."

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. a. The concept of operation in the 1st Cavalry Division OPORD 6617 was: "Division continues the attack against the 2d VC Regiment northeast of the Vinh Thanh Valley with the 1st Brigade. Operations will be conducted so as to construct landing zones as quickly as possible, radially north and east of the present enemy contact along major routes and trails. Forces will be deployed into these landing zones to press the enemy against the forces now in contact. The enemy will be pursued regardless of his direction of movement. 2d Brigade maintains the I FFORCEV and division reserve/reaction force at Pleiku and conducts tactical route security on Highway 19 from an Khe to Pleiku. 3d Brigade secures the division base and conducts offensive operations in the TAOR."

b. The 1st Brigade was further directed to, "(1) Continue the attack in zone to destroy the 2d VC Regiment. Pursue the enemy regardless of his direction of movement.

(2) Maximum effort will be made to capture a prisoner for intelligence purposes."

c. As the operation progressed, it appeared that additional forces would be required to completely seal off escape routes of the 2d VC Regiment. The 2d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment CRID and Task Force Bravo, 22d ARVN Division came under OCA 1st Cavalry Division and were to be used with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to encircle the area where major elements of the 2d VC Regiment were believed located. Following several days of intensive bombardment, including B52 strikes, 4 CIDG companies were to be air assaulted into the sealed-off sector of the AO to conduct extensive patrolling. Elements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division were to be prepared to conduct air assaults into the center of the sealed sector in the event CIDG patrolling developed significant contact.

11. EXECUTION. a. Initial contact in Operation CRAZY HORSE was made by a CIDG patrol in the Vinh Thanh Valley when the lead element of an estimated VC platoon was ambushed. Documents and material captured indicated that the VC were plan-

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ning an attack to liberate the Vinh Thanh Valley during the period of no moon, 18 - 23 May. During the same period, agent reports indicated that the enemy was building his strength in the mountains east of the Vinh Thanh Valley. The following paragraphs summarize operations in the CRAZY HORSE AO. A detailed discussion of each day's operations is at paragraph 11, Inclosure 2 and paragraph 7, Inclosure 3.

b. On 16 May, Company B, 2d Bn, 8th Cav was committed to investigate an area where the VC were thought to be assembling for an attack on the Vinh Thanh USSF Camp. The company became heavily engaged with an estimated VC battalion and two additional companies from the 1st Brigade were committed.

c. On 17 May two additional battalions of the 1st Brigade were committed in the AO, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav to reinforce elements on the ground, the 2d Bn, 12th Cav to block the most likely VC escape routes to the east. Contact continued throughout the day.

d. Early in the morning of 18 May, one company of the 2d Bn, 12th Cav became heavily engaged with a sizable VC force, the contact continuing until dark. The 2d Bn, 12th Cav remained in blocking positions, while the 1st Bn, 5th Cav continued to sweep to the east. By nightfall, one company of the 1st Bn, 5th Cav had linked up with the blocking force. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav (-) continued to secure landing zones and artillery positions. The 2d Bn, 8th Cav was airlifted from the division base to the USSF/CIDG Camp in the Vinh Thanh Valley (SAVOY) as the 1st Brigade reserve/reaction force.

e. On 19 May, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav and the 2d Bn, 12th Cav conducted a sweep through the area of heavy contact on 18 May. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav continued to secure LZ's, while the 2d Bn, 8th Cav remained at SAVOY as the brigade reserve/reaction force. Light, isolated contact was reported throughout the day.

f. On 20 May, the 1st Brigade continued to search for VC elements remaining within the AO. The 1st Bn, 5th Cav began to sweep to the north of the area of contact. The 2d Bn, 12th Cav was relieved by the 1st Bn, 8th Cav from the division base area. The 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav screened the flanks and secured an artillery battery which was lifted into the Suoi Ca Valley. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav secured the installations in the Vinh Thanh Valley and the 2d Bn, 8th Cav provided the brigade reserve/reaction force.

g. During 21 May, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav and the 1st Bn, 8th Cav continued their sweep to the north and east. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav secured artillery positions, while the 2d Bn, 8th Cav provided the brigade reserve/reaction force. The elements pushing east engaged and destroyed a company size VC force. A mortar platoon from the 1st Bn, 12th Cav was attacked during the afternoon and suffered heavy casualties.

h. The 1st Brigade continued to sweep in the AO with the 1st Bn, 5th Cav, 1st Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 12th Cav on 22 and 23 May. The 2d Bn, 8th Cav remained at SAVOY as the brigade reserve/reaction force.

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- i. On 24 May, the four battalions of the brigade moved to establish blocking positions surrounding the AO. All available TAC Air and artillery were directed against likely enemy targets within the ring formed by the battalions.
- j. The brigade continued in blocking positions on 25 May. TAC Air, artillery and two B52 strikes were directed against suspected VC strongholds.
- k. On 26 May, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav, 1st Bn, 8th Cav, 2d Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 12th Cav continued in blocking positions on likely routes of egress from the AO while maximum artillery and TAC Air strikes were placed on probable VC concentrations. Four CIDG companies were delivered into the center of the ring to locate any remaining VC elements.
- l. On 27 May, the 1st Brigade continued to occupy blocking positions around the area of operations, using four battalions and the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav. Light and scattered contact was reported throughout the day.
- m. On 28 May, the 1st Brigade continued to occupy blocking positions surrounding the AO. An ARVN battalion, Task Force Bravo, replaced the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav in the AO. A ROK battalion replaced the 1st Bn, 8th Cav, which then began deployment to the northern portion of the AO.
- n. On 29 and 30 May, the 1st Brigade continued to block routes of egress from the AO with four US battalions, one air cavalry squadron (-), one ROK battalion and ARVN Task Force Bravo. Three CIDG companies continued to search the encircled land mass with light to heavy contact during the period. The CIDG were joined by part of one US battalion in search operations on 30 May. TAC Air strikes and artillery fires were used extensively on likely VC locations.
- o. On 31 May, the 1st brigade, with the 1st Bn, 8th Cav, 2d Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 12th Cav, continued to block likely escape routes during the day. The 1st Bn, 5th Cav and the remaining three CIDG companies were extracted from the AO.
- p. On 1 June, the Brigade continued to conduct offensive operations in assigned sector employing the 1st Bn, 8th Cav; 2d Bn, 8th Cav; 1st Bn, 12th Cav and one ROK battalion. ARVN Task Force Bravo (-) and the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) were withdrawn from the AO.
- q. During 2 June, the 1st Brigade conducted search operations in the high ground between the Vinh Thanh Valley and the Soui Ca Valley employing the 1st Bn, 8th Cav, 2d Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 12th Cav, one ROK battalion, one air cavalry troop and one ARVN scout company.
- r. On 3 and 4 June, the 1st Brigade continued to search the high ground east of the Vinh Thanh Valley with the 1st Bn, 8th Cav, 2d Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 12th Cav and one ROK battalion.

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s. During 5 June, the 1st Cavalry Division concluded Operation CRAZY HORSE with the extraction of the 2d Bn, 8th Cav, 1st Bn, 12th Cav and the ROK battalions by air, and the 1st Bn, 8th Cav overland. All units closed Camp Radcliff by 1900 hours and CRAZY HORSE was terminated effective 052400 June 1966.

12. RESULTS. a. FWMAF losses:

	<u>US</u>	<u>ROKA</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
KIA	83*	14	6	2
WIA	356*	18	10	0
MIA	1	0	0	0

(* These figures include 4 SF KIA and 10 WIA)

b. Enemy losses Operation CRAZY HORSE:

	<u>1ST CAV</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VC KIA	350	123	34	507
VC KIA (estimate)	331		50	381
VC WIA (estimate)	173		2	175
VCC	26	2		28
VCS	111	3		114
WEAPONS				
Individual Weapons	82	6	9	97
Crew Served Weapons	9	7		16
AMMUNITION				
Small arms	26,300	777		27,077
Mortar Ammo	76			76
RR Ammo	35	3		38
Grenades	166	54		220
Mines	14			14
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT				
Radios (PRC 10)	2	1		3
FOODSTUFFS				
Rice/Barley	90,025 lbs			90,025 lbs
Salt	20,875 lbs			20,875 lbs
MISCELLANEOUS				
10 mortar fuses, 54 blasting caps, 1 detonator, 5 sections - Bangalore Torpedo, 30 - 1/2 lb blocks explosive, 2 pair binoculars, 2 compasses, 8 signal flares, 240 lbs medical supplies, 260 lbs documents, 1 typewriter, 2 bicycles, 20 shovels, 360 uniforms, and 106 packs.				

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. a. In the initial phase of the operation, support was provided through regular base support channels. When it became apparent the operation was to become an extended one, the 1st Forward Support Element was constituted and began supporting the operation from Camp Radcliff. Supplies were received from the Qui Nhon Support Command by GLOC into Camp Radcliff. Supplies were delivered from Camp Radcliff to using units utilizing, for the most part, organic rotary wing aircraft. When the required destination was accessible by road,

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wheeled vehicles were used. As the operation continued, forward supply points were established in the vicinity of the Vinh Thanh CIDG Camp and Hammond Airfield, Phu Cat. When these supply points became operational, bulk Class III and Class V supplies were throughput by GLOC directly to the supply points from the supporting depot at Qui Nhon. There were no unusual supply problems encountered during Operation CRAZY HORSE. Tonnage of various classes of supply used in the operation and means of delivery utilized are listed below:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>TONS DELIVERED FORWARD BY GROUND</u>	<u>TONS DELIVERED FORWARD BY AIR</u>
I	67,956 Meals	44.10 S/T	25.98 S/T
II & IV	Misc Items	.50 S/T	
III - JP-4	227,000 Gallons	15.75 S/T	801.40 S/T
AVGAS	11,000 Gallons	1.60 S/T	33.30 S/T
MOGAS	6,500 Gallons		21.77 S/T
DIESEL	2,500 Gallons		9.50 S/T
V		459.28 S/T	1,541.42 S/T
TOTAL		<u>521.23 S/T</u>	<u>2,433.37 S/T</u>

b. Army Aviation Performance Data - See Inclosure 4.

c. Additional administrative matters reported by HQ, 1st Brigade are found in paragraph 13 of Inclosure 2.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. a. During Operation CRAZY HORSE, the 1st Cavalry Division established a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The facility was located within the Vinh Thanh Valley USSE/CIDG Camp Compound (SAVOY).

(1) The mission of the CSCC was to coordinate TAC Air, artillery and Psy Ops support for all units committed to CRAZY HORSE.

(2) The CSCC performed essentially the missions of a Fire Support Element, for although the CSCC was prepared and equipped to allocate resources made available for CRAZY HORSE, the assignment of missions through the Task Organization removed much of the latitude of the CSCC coordinator.

b. Additional evaluation of special equipment and techniques are to be found in paragraph 14, Inclosure 2.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS. a. Significant results of CRAZY HORSE:

(1) The VC organization in Binh Dinh Province suffered a severe setback through the capture of documents which revealed rosters, code names and designations of VC military and political units.

(2) The loss of large quantities of foodstuffs, medical supplies and destruction of installations should create a serious logistics problem for VC units operating in Binh Dinh Province for several months.

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(3) Additional comments and analysis are found at paragraph 15, Inclosure 2.

b. Lessons learned:

(1) Problem: Pursuit of VC forces.

Discussion: On 3 June a ROK element of 13 men pursued a VC force attempting to break contact. The VC ambushed the pursuit force and killed nearly all of them.

Recommendation: Pursuit of a VC force should be done with caution and with sufficient firepower to permit recon by fire and adequate reaction to an ambush.

(2) Problem: Sweep operations.

Discussion: Co C, 1st En, 12th Cav had been sweeping an area with the entire company. The company left their mortar platoon in a clearing to support by fire while the rest of the company continued the sweep. The mortar platoon was attacked by the VC and suffered heavy casualties.

Recommendation: A unit cannot assume that a jungle area through which it has passed without contact has in fact been cleared. No area can be considered as behind the lines and all types of units must establish adequate perimeter security.

(3) Problem: Displacement of small forces.

Discussion: During the early stages of CRAZY HORSE, a small force stayed at LZ Herford for several days. The VC attacked and shelled this position frequently inflicting considerable casualties.

Recommendation: Units incapable of providing patrols out to mortar range should change locations frequently to avoid coming under repeated mortar attacks.

(4) Problem: Lack of communications in CIDG companies.

Discussion: Considerable communications difficulty has been experienced during operations with CIDG companies.

Recommendations: During CRAZY HORSE, artillery FO parties were attached to each CIDG Company, providing a rapid means to call for fire when contact was made and affording a means of communication which would otherwise have been lacking.

(5) Problem: Attempted ambush during Psy Ops mission.

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Discussion: Rallyer instructions, known to friendly ground and aviation elements, are followed closely by individuals fleeing VC control. As a US helicopter descended into a clearing where a would-be VC rallyer was waving his shirt, 5 other VC fired on the helicopter from the wood line.

Recommendation: aircrews should be appraised of this tactic and chase ships should be alert to a possible ambush attempt under similar circumstances.

c. Psy Ops Summary:

(1) Psychological warfare support for Operation CRAZY HORSE was coordinated by the Division Psy Ops Officer with the Pleiku Detachment, 245th Psy Ops Company for leaflet and ground loudspeaker/interpreter teams. The 5th Air Commando Squadron (USAF) provided U10 aircraft for aerial loudspeaker and small leaflet drops and C47 aircraft for large leaflet drops. Advice and Vietnamese interpreter support was provided by the JUSPAO representative attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. Psy War activity in support of Operation CRAZY HORSE follows:

Leaflet Missions	70
Number of Leaflets	5,970,000
Loudspeaker Millions	60
Loudspeaker Hours	56
Ground Loudspeaker/ Interpreter Team	7 days at brigade or below

Four ralliers were recorded during Operation CRAZY HORSE, one to the 1st Cavalry Division and three to an attached ARVN Scout Company.

(2) Significant Psy Ops activities during CRAZY HORSE:

(a) The Pleiku Detachment, 245th Psy Ops Company, filled an order for 100,000 leaflets within 14 hours of receipt of the request.

(b) All ralliers and at least three prisoners expressed concern over turning themselves in to any but Vietnamese-speaking forces. They felt the language barrier would prove detrimental to their welfare.

(c) South Vietnamese VC filler personnel complained that their North Vietnamese cadre did not subject themselves to the same risks as the forward elements during the battles.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. A great deal of time and effort was spent attempting to locate VC elements after the initial periods of heavy contact. Greater success might have resulted from more aggressive use of all reconnaissance means available to the division, particularly through day and night use of the Mohawk aircraft.

b. Although the division made effective use of airstrikes and artillery firepower during the later stages of Operation CRAZY HORSE, more could have been requested and used during the first few days of the operation.

AVDACT


10 September 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

c. Logistics elements played a major role during Operation CRAZY HORSE, conducting both ground and air resupply in all sorts of weather over extremely difficult terrain. To insure maximum use of resupply capability, the decision to request resupply should be made early enough each day to permit ordinary resupply missions to be carried out in daylight.

d. The use of CIDG companies in conjunction with major elements of the 1st Cavalry Division established a precedent. However, US commanders should be prepared to provide liaison and communications to CIDG companies committed in support of his unit. CIDG companies should also be used within their capabilities as a lightly armed patrolling or screening force.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DANIEL B. PLYLER
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

4 Incl
as

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- 1 - Comdt, USA Engr Sch, Ft Belvoir, Va 22060
- 1 - CO, USA Inf HUMRO Unit, Ft Benning, Ga 31905
- 1 - Comdt, USAAGSC, Ft Leavenworth, Kan 66027
- 1 - Comdt, USAAGS, Ft Ben Harrison, Ind.

ARMY AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE DATA

1. Army aircraft performance data Operation CRAZY HORSE:

<u>Type A/cft</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Pax</u>
OH-13	1,727	2,957	1,791.1	1.1	507
UH-1	3,457	8,567	6,501.3	749.6	23,425*
CH-47	110	2,700	773.5	3458.3	7,352
CH-54	17	94	37.6	271.0	8
CV-2	92	138	580.5	150.9	813
TO-1D	54	87	110.9	0.0	0

*Includes 249 patients medically evacuated.

Artillery batteries lifted: 17.

Infantry battalions lifted: 28.

2. Hit experience Operation CRAZY HORSE: 40 aircraft hit, 1 shot down, recovered repairable.

Incl 4

14

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GL 90

SCALE: 1:250,000

GL 90

AO CRAZY HORSE

Div RACK

GL 57

3 X 1

GL 50

GL 67

1st Bde 1st Air

XX

Div RACK Inf

3d Bde X X CAP ROK Inf

Inclosure 1 (CRAZY HORSE RD) to Combat Operations Report, 1st Air Bde
Operation CRAZY HORSE.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE (AIRBORNE)
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO U.S. Forces 96490

AVCBER-SC

15 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
(MACV/RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
ATTN: G3
APO U.S. Forces 96490

1. NAME: OPERATION CRAZY HORSE
2. DATES: 16 May - 5 June 1966
3. LOCATION: Binh Dinh Province, II Corps Tactical Zone, RVN Area bounded by Nation Highway Nr 1 on the east, north to BR 8890, west to BR 5090, southeast to BR 5058, southeast to BR 5766, south to BR 5750, southeast to BR 6447, northeast to BR 7050, south to BR 7047, and east to National Highway Nr 1 closing vicinity BR 9147. (See Inclosure Nr 1)
4. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS: 1st Brigade (Airborne)
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel John J. Hennessey, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

HHC, 1st Abn Bde	2nd Bn (Abn), 19th Arty (DS)
1st Bn (Abn), 12th Cav	Btry, 2nd Bn, 17th Arty
1st Bn (Abn), 8th Cav (20 May-5 June)	A Co, 8th Engr Bn
2nd Bn (Abn), 8th Cav	Plat (-), 545th MP Co
1st Bn, 5th Cav (17-21 May)	Sig Spt Tm, 13th Sig Bn
2nd Bn, 12th Cav (17-21 May)	Tm 1, IPW/CI Tm, 191st MI Det
Task Force Bravo (ARVN) (28 May-1 June)	Tm 1, 10th RRU
2nd Bn, Cav Regt (ROK) (28 May-5 June)	Tm 1, 16th Weather Sqdn
CIDG (4 Co's) (26 - 31 May)	Fwd Spt Elm (Spt)
	Water Pt, 8th Engr

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7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. USAF

(1) Aircraft

(a)	Immediate Sorties	106
(b)	Pre-planned Sorties	154
(c)	Illumination Sorties	6
(d)	B-52 Sorties	21
(e)	Total Sorties	287

(2) Ordnance

(a)	General Purpose Bombs	914
(b)	Fragmentation Bombs	260
(c)	CBU	56
(d)	Napalm	125

b. Artillery: See Annex A, After Action Report Operation CRAZY HORSE
2nd Bn (Abn), 19th Arty

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General:

From evidence gathered during CRAZY HORSE, it appears certain that VC forces were about launch a massive offensive in the VINH THANH VALLEY during the latter part of May. Furthermore it appears that the VC had planned a full scale interdiction campaign against Hwy # 19 in the vicinity of AN KHE PASS and against the VINH THANH VALLEY road. It is also probable that the VC had planned harassing actions against CAMP RIDCLIFF in conjunction with the offensive. The VC objectives, no doubt, were to obtain a major victory, thereby increasing their prestige and morale and to regain control of the VINH THANH VALLEY.

Operation CRAZY HORSE not only disrupted the VC plans, but also inflicted heavy losses on the forces which had been concentrated in the mountains east of the VINH THANH VALLEY. Additionally it appears from captured documents that the VC BINH DINH PROVINCE Headquarters was located in the mountains at the northwest corner of the SOU CA VALLEY. It is probable that CRAZY HORSE disrupted the VC Provincial Infrastructure to a degree that several months will be required before its functions effectively again. The large quantities of rice, salt and medical supplies confiscated will put a serious crimp in the VC logistical system. Several hundred pounds of documents were captured, which when fully analyzed, should provide a complete picture of the VC organization in BINH DINH Province

b. Enemy situation prior to the operation: During the period 1-15 May there was a gradual increase of VC activity in the VINH THANH VALLEY area. From the 10th of May to the 15th of May CIDG patrols made daily contact with groups of VC up to platoon size. On 15 May a CIDG patrol ambushed the lead element of a estimated platoon size force approximately 6 kilometers east of the VINH THANH Special Forces Camp. Five VC were killed and a 120mm light, artillery compass and numerous documents were captured. Among the documents were firing tables and target lists for 120mm mortars. The VINH THANH USSF Camp was among the targets listed. Additionally the documents identified the dead VC as being members of C-14 Company, 32nd Artillery Battalion. The company is normally equipped with two 120mm mortars. A captured map showed possible mortar position locations which generally tied in with target data. During this same period agent reports indicated that the enemy was building his strength in the mountains east of the VINH THANH VALLEY in preparation for an offensive in the valley itself. On 9 May a CIDG patrol captured a VC who claimed that the VC planned to liberate the VINH THANH VALLEY during the period of no moon 18 - 23 May.

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In view of all this information it was felt that possibly one regiment from the 610th (SAO VANG) division supported by a 120 mm mortar battery was in the mountains east of the VINH THUAN VALLEY. On 16 May B Company, 2/8 Cav, was lifted into LZ HERFORD to conduct a reconnaissance and establish the nature of enemy activity in the mountains to the east of the valley. The company was heli-lifted to the LZ and began moving up the ridge to the east. After moving less than 1000 meters, the lead platoon became engaged with an estimated platoon of VC. As the afternoon wore on, the company became more heavily engaged and by evening they were in contact with a battalion size force. The VC in this case were very aggressive; one VC leader was reported to be a tall, broad shouldered man who disdainfully exposed himself to American fire. Reinforcements were lifted into LZ HERFORD just prior to darkness and the combined forces were able to hold through the night 16-17 May. As a result of this engagement it was felt that VC strength in the mountains east of VINH THUAN consisted of 1 or possibly 2 regiments of the 610th Division and it was decided to commit additional forces.

c. Development of the enemy situation:

In order to more fully develop the situation and to block the escape of enemy forces along the major trail network to the north and northeast, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, was committed into LZ HORSE on 17 May. After encountering light resistance on LZ HORSE, 2/12 Cav units deployed and attempted to occupy Hill 776 northwest of the landing zone. They came under heavy fire from the crest of an unnumbered hill south of hill 776 and were unable to overcome the strong VC resistance. Heavy fighting continued in this area throughout the next day with the 2/12 Cav finally occupying the hill at nightfall. As a result of this action it became apparent that the enemy was not withdrawing as expected but instead was defending and counterattacking with an aggressiveness and tenacity not previously encountered. Aerial and ground reconnaissance of trails leading into the SOVI CH VALLEY and the CROWS FOOT Area (KIM SON VALLEY) could not detect any large scale movement of the VC forces into either of these two areas. It was therefore concluded that the enemy still occupied the mountains east of VINH THUAN with a strength of at least 1 and possibly 2 regiments.

On the morning of 21 May, B and C Companies, 1st Bn, 8th Cav, began to move up the valley running northeast from LZ HORSE. By noon both companies were in contact with a well dug in VC force estimated to be a reinforced company. Heavy fighting continued throughout the afternoon and night lasting until 0200 hours, 22 May, before all enemy resistance ceased. Reports revealed that the VC were well dug in, disciplined, and had high morale. Captured documents from dead VC identified the unit engaged as probably being the 8th Battalion, 22nd NVA Regiment (AKA QUIET TAM), 610th Division (AKA SAO VANG). Sixty bodies were found in the area following this engagement. At the same time other units of the 1/8 Cav were experiencing light contact around LZ HORSE.

At approximately 211425 May an estimated VC company reinforced by 60mm mortar and machine guns assaulted LZ HERFORD overrunning the C/1/12 Mortar Platoon which was positioned on the LZ at the time. The attack was opened with 60mm mortar fire B-40 rocket fire and machine gun fire from the vicinity of Hill 571 west of the landing zone. Immediately after the supporting fire lifted, VC swarmed onto the LZ from the high ground to the east. The mortar platoon was forced off the LZ with 16 killed, four wounded, and 1 missing.

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By 22 May no definite pattern of enemy movement had yet been established. One VCC stated that he had seen groups of NVA personnel moving generally north through the lower CROWS FOOT Area during the period 17 - 20 May 1966. His report was very vague, however, and provided no real basis for believing that any large VC unit had actually retreated in that direction. VCS personnel picked up in the SOU. CA. VALLEY indicated that they had seen only random movement of small groups of NVA personnel in that area. One ARVN Soldier who had been held captive by the Viet Cong in the CROWS FOOT Area for over one year was picked up much later in the operation and he stated that he had seen the QUYET TIM Regt (AKA 22nd Regt) move north from NGHIA DINH (5) HAMLET (BR 908746) on 20 May 1966. Although this information could not be confirmed, it is probable that the 22nd NVA Regt did retreat south through the CROWS FOOT during the period 18-21 May, and the element contacted by 1/8 Cav northeast of LZ HORSE on 21 May was a rear guard detachment held behind to allow the main body to escape. Meanwhile the 2nd VC Regt probably remained in the mountain area in an unknown location.

On 26 May four CIDG Companies entered the AO to conduct extensive patrolling. Shortly after landing at LZ MONKEY (BR 680643), one CIDG Company made contact with an estimated VC Battalion 2 kilometers northwest of the LZ. The CIDG unit attempted to break contact, but was unable to do so; later they withdrew to evacuate their casualties to LZ MONKEY. Just prior to darkness an attempt was made to reinforce at MONKEY; however the second ship into the landing zone was downed by enemy fire and no other aircraft could land. During the night of 26 - 27 May the VC broke contact around LZ MONKEY.

On 30 May a CIDG patrol reported heavy contact with a VC platoon or possibly a larger force approximately 3 kilometers south of LZ HORSE. A Company, 1/8 Cav went into the area to reinforce and continued to receive sniper fire throughout the night of 30-31 May.

On 1 June, the 2nd Battalion of the ROK Cavalry Regiment began a running battle with what was believed to be a VC Main Force Battalion as they pushed north from their blocking positions around the southern boundary of the AO. By the 5th of June, the ROK's had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy unit (possibly the B-210 Bn).

During the occupation of blocking and ambush positions around the AO all units experienced contact with groups of VC ranging from 2-30 personnel. The bulk of these personnel consisted of hamlet and village guerrillas, rice carriers, couriers, food production personnel and local VC cadre. Two highly successful ambushes were sprung during this period. Shortly after dark on 24 May, 15 VC walked into a 1/9 Cav claymore mine ambush resulting in 15 VC KIA (30). On 30 May the 1/8 Cav killed 6 VC in the lower CROWS FOOT (BR 741737) with an ambush set up on the basis of information provided by an ARVN POW who had been liberated from the VC.

In both the CROWS FOOT and SOU. CA. VALLEY areas approximately 40 tons of rice and 10 tons of salt were found and destroyed. The 1/5 Cav discovered a weapons repair shop (BR 669739) and a large cache of ammunition and medical supplies (BR 697671) during their operations in the northern portion of the AO. During 2/8 Cav operations in the SOU. CA. VALLEY large quantities of VC documents were captured. Initial screening of the documents suggested that several sections of the VC BINH DINH Province Committee had recently been located in this area, to include the security section, the food production section, the communications section, and the finance and economic sections.

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VC attempts at road mining in the CRAZY HORSE AO were generally unsuccessful. CIDG troops uncovered four anti-vehicular mines along the VINH THANH Valley road on 16 May. D Troop, 1/9 Cav, found one satchel type mine along the VINH THANH Valley and at BR 833576 on 21 May. In the same area they also found a large crater in the road with demolition equipment, a pressure type fuse and fresh blood nearby indicating the VC mine laying party had accidentally discharged one of their own mines. On 23 May D Troop, 1/9 Cav, 1/4 ton vehicle detonated a mine at BR 240560 resulting in destruction of the vehicle and four US WIA's. Nearby another mine was found in the road and destroyed in place.

During the 1/8 Cav operations in the KIM SON VALLEY (CROWS FOOT), many civilians were noted to be carrying what seemed to be excessive sums of money. It was felt that the VC were paying these people to act as laborers.

Prisoners captured during CRAZY HORSE proved to be of little immediate intelligence value. One ARVN PCN was liberated from the VC. Eight VC rallied to the government side as a result of Psy Op loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops.

d. New Identifications: Identification of enemy units engaged during CRAZY HORSE proved rather difficult due to the lack of knowledgeable POW's; however, the following enemy units were identified to the degree indicated:

CONFIRMED	PROBABLE	POSSIBLE
2d VC Regiment	E-210 Bn (VC 1st)	8th Bn, 22d Regt
D-26 LF Co (-)	Security, Commo,	9th Bn, 22d Regt
703d Sapper Co (-)	Finance and Economic	6th Bn, 12th Regt
300th Guerrilla Co	Sections, BINH DINH	559th Bn (Infil Gp)
11th Co, 22d Arty Bn	Province	
Supply Sect, BINH KHE Dist		

e. Terrain and weather environment: The terrain in the CRAZY HORSE AO could best be described as a perfect haven for guerrilla forces. The rugged mountains east of the VINH THANH Valley provide ideal base areas for large VC units up to division size. The fertile valleys which surround the mountains provide a plentiful supply of food and recruits for the VC organization. An intricate trail network (Incl 2) links the valleys with the mountain safe areas providing the VC with innumerable escape routes and liaison corridors. In addition, the VC have a highly developed infrastructure among the population of the area which enables their military units to make maximum use of human resources. Helicopter landing zones in the mountain area are few in number and small in size.

The weather did prove to be a limiting factor on several occasions during CRAZY HORSE; however, it did not seriously hamper the operation. Heavy rain and a low ceiling on the evening and night of 21-22 May prevented resupply aircraft from reaching the forward area. Artillery ammunition was resupplied by ground convoy during the night. On that night the weather also precluded the medical evacuation of a number of seriously wounded personnel. Heavy rain showers and low ceilings were common during the late afternoon and early evening thereby limiting aerial activity during this period.

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9. MISSION:

a. Directed Missions:

- (1) Continue the attack in zone to destroy the 2nd VC Regiment. Pursue the enemy regardless of his direction of movement.
- (2) Maximum effort will be made to capture a prisoner for intelligence purposes.

b. Implied Missions: None

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

a. Phase I (16-24 May) The basic concept of the brigade operation during this period was initially to reinforce elements in contact followed by the employment of two battalions, one to block and the other to maintain contact. Two reserve battalions were poised ready to be committed once the main axis of withdrawal could be determined. Artillery was positioned to provide continuous fire support for the infantry elements.

b. Phase II (24 May - 5 June) The concept of this phase was to utilize maximum strength to block possible withdrawal routes from the area of operations while all available TAC Air and artillery was employed to destroy or drive out the remaining enemy elements. Again artillery was positioned to provide complete coverage of the operational area. Following three days of intensive bombardment the area was to be swept again to totally destroy the last remaining elements of the enemy force.

11. EXECUTION:

a. 16 May 66 (Incl # 5)

(1) General: Prior to the action which initiated Operation CRAZY HORSE the brigade continued its mission of defending the Division Base Area and airfield, securing Hwy #19 to the east of AN KHE, and conducting small unit operations within the Division TAOR. During the mid-morning hours B Company, 2/8 Cav, was dispatched to investigate an area where a captured VC document had indicated the VC may be assembling for an attack on the VINH THANH USSF Camp (SAVOY). Three and a half hours after landing in the area the company became heavily engaged with an estimated VC battalion and two additional companies from the brigade were committed. One of these companies linked up with B Company 2/8 Cav shortly after dark and the VC contact decreased.

(2) 2/8 Cav: A and C Companies continued to secure Hwy # 19 from AN KHE to the eastern end of the DEO MING PASS. At 1045 hours B Company lifted off from the base camp and touched down at LZ HERFORD (BR 664629) at 1100 hrs. The company then moved up the ridge to the east and at 1430 hours reported contact with an estimated 10-12 VC. The contact continued to increase in intensity until 1631 hours when the company estimated that they were then in contact with a VC battalion. At 1705 hours mortar rounds began to fall on LZ HERFORD. At approximately 1700 hours a rifle platoon from A Co 2/8 Cav was assigned the mission of providing security for two 8 inch guns of the 3/18 Arty which moved from the base camp to the VINH THANH Valley. The guns were in position five kilometers south of the USSF Camp by 1830 hours. Low ceilings in the area prevented reinforcement of B Company until 1812 hours when A Company 1/12 Cav landed at LZ HERFORD. C Company 1/12 Cav followed A Company into the landing zone at 1850 hours. Both companies were then attached to the 2/8 Cav. C Company remained at LZ HERFORD while A Company moved up the ridge to the east and linked up with B Company at 2230 hrs. At 2245 hours the VC broke contact.

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(3) 1/12 Cav: B Company remained attached to 1/8 Cav on the barrier line and C Company conducted reconnaissance patrols vicinity LZ GOLD (BR 538562). At 1441 hours the battalion was alerted that B Company 2/8 was in contact with a VC force of undetermined size. A and C Companies were instructed to prepare for movement and at 1753 hours A Company departed the base area. C Company departed LZ GOLD at 1835 hours for LZ HERFORD. Both companies were attached to the 2/8 Cav on landing at LZ HERFORD.

(4) 1/8 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy the base defense barrier line with B Company, 1/12 Cav, attached.

(5) 1/5 Cav: At 1820 hours the battalion was attached to 1st Brigade and directed to be prepared for commitment into the area vicinity LZ HERFORD.

b. 17 May 66 (Incl # 6)

(1) As contact continued to develop at LZ HERFORD the brigade committed two additional battalions into the area. One battalion reinforced the elements already on the ground vicinity LZ HERFORD and the other battalion was to block the most likely VC escape route to the east. Enemy contact ranged from heavy shortly after sunrise to sporadic throughout the remainder of the day. During the afternoon the brigade was released from responsibility for the defense of the barrier line and Hwy # 19. The units assigned those missions were attached to the 3rd Brigade.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0700 the first elements of A Company lifted off from the division base and touched down at LZ HERFORD at 0715 hours. The remainder of the battalion followed A Company into the LZ closing at 1200 hours. From HERFORD C Company 1/5 and C Co 1/12 (OCA to 1/5 Cav) moved east to secure the ridge overlooking the landing zone. At 1300 hours A and B Companies began to sweep along the ridge to the east. At dusk A Company was located at BR 677629, B Company at BR 675622, C Company at BR 677628 and D Company remained securing the battalion CP at LZ HERFORD. The battalion experienced sporadic small arms fire during the afternoon and was probed several times during the hours of darkness by VC throwing handgrenades.

(3) 1/8 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy the base defense barrier line with B Company, 1/12 Cav, attached. At 1500 hours the battalion was detached from 1st Brigade control and attached to the 3rd Brigade which assumed the base defense mission. At 1800 hours B Company 1/12 Cav was detached from battalion control and attached to the 2/8 Cav.

(4) 2/8 Cav: A and C Companies continued to secure Hwy # 19 from AN KHE to the eastern end of the DEO MUNG PASS. At 1500 hours the 3rd Brigade assumed this mission and both companies were attached to the 3rd Brigade. B Company, having spent the night vicinity BR 672629m with A Company 1/12, received a heavy VC probe at 0614 hours. The probe was repulsed and the company spent the remainder of the morning moving casualties down the ridge to LZ HERFORD, where the casualties were evacuated. At approximately 1600 hours the company was extracted from LZ HERFORD and closed into the base camp at 1618 hrs.

(5) 1/12 Cav: B Company remained attached to the 1/8 Cav occupying its assigned portion of the barrier line until 1800 hours when the company was attached to 2/8 Cav in the base area. A Company in the vicinity of BR 672629 received several small probes during the night and at 0614 hours was attacked by a VC force supported by automatic weapons and mortars. The attack was repulsed. At 0700 hours the battalion assumed responsibility of all elements vicinity LZ HERFORD.

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At 1020 hours C Company began to sweep east up the ridge from LZ HERFORD. Contact with VC forces remained light throughout the afternoon and evening hours. At 1600 hours B Company 2/8 Cav was detached from control of the battalion and returned to base camp. D Company and the battalion CP lifted off from the base area and closed LZ COBRA (BR 614606) at 1725 hours.

(6) 2/12 Cav: At 1147 hours the battalion air assaulted into LZ HORSE with the recon platoon to secure and improve the landing zone. B and C Companies followed the recon platoon into the landing zone and at 1553 hours, after one platoon from A Company had touched down, the landing zone came under mortar attack. At approximately the same time B Company which had pushed north from the landing zone came under automatic weapons fire vicinity BR 693634. The contact continued until dark when contact by the enemy was broken. At that time B Company was located vicinity BR 693634 with A Company on their right flank and C Company on LZ HORSE. The remainder of the battalion was located at BR 615598.

o. 18 May 1966 (Incl # 7)

(1) General: Early in the morning one company of the 2/12 Cav which had been air lifted into LZ HORSE to block the VC escape route became heavily engaged with a sizable VC force. Contact remained heavy in this area until dark. The battalion pushing east from LZ HERFORD against the blocking force experienced light contact during their movement and by nightfall one company had linked up with the blocking force. The third battalion (-) in the operational area continued to secure landing zones and artillery positions. Just prior to dark a fourth battalion was airlifted from the Division Base to LZ SAVOY to serve as the brigade reserve reaction force.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0705 hours A Company commenced sweeping north from its overnight location to LZ MONKEY (BR 684648) where it remained overnight. C Company followed by C Company 1/12 Cav continued to sweep along the ridge to the east. At 1227 hours the company received several rounds of sniper fire vicinity BR 685634. Both companies continued on to the vicinity of LZ MILTON (BR 688635) where they remained for the night. B Company moved overland up the valley floor toward LZ HORSE (BR 693630) arriving at that location at approximately 1900 hours. The battalion CP with A Company, 1/12 Cav remained at LZ HERFORD. Throughout the day and early evening hours the elements on LZ HERFORD received sporadic small arms fire.

(3) 2/8 Cav: The battalion remained attached to the 3rd Brigade in the base area until 1200 hours when the battalion was assigned the mission of providing the reserve for the 1st Brigade on 30 minute alert. At 1540 hours A Company, 2/8 Cav, was attached to the 1/12 Cav and alerted to move to LZ COBRA. The first elements of A Company lifted off MUSTANG at 1603 hours. At 1905 hours the battalion (-) lifted off MUSTANG and closed LZ SAVOY (BR 614596) at 1914 hours. The battalion then assumed the mission of providing the brigade reserve/reaction force.

(4) 1/12 Cav: A Company remained at LZ HERFORD throughout the day providing security for 1/5 Cav elements at that location. At 0938 hours C Company (OCA 1/5), following C Company, 1/5, swept from vicinity BR 672629 to LZ MILTON (BR 688636) where at 1756 hours the company joined C Company, 1/5 for the night. B Company remained attached to the 2/8 Cav in the Division Base area. At 1540 hours A Company, 2/8 Cav, was attached to the battalion and closed LZ COBRA from the base area at 1643 hours.

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(5) 2/12 Cav: At 0640 hours, B Company, which had been pushing north from LZ HORSE to establish a blocking position, came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire vicinity BR 695635. At 1047 hours the company came under mortar fire from the north. Following TAC air strikes the company continued to push north against a VC force estimated at company strength until 1600 hours, vicinity BR 693636 when they encountered a line of bunkers, trenches and foxholes and their advance was stopped temporarily. Again TAC Air and artillery were employed; but the company was unable to advance prior to dark. A Company, which had been sweeping to the east of B Company, moved overland against light resistance and linked up with B Company at approximately 1120 hours. C Company remained in a blocking position vicinity LZ HORSE where it was joined by B Company, 1/5 Cav, at 1900 hours. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ COBRA.

1. 19 May 66 (Incl # 8)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued the operation with two battalions sweeping through the area of the previous days heavy contact. The third battalion continued to secure LZ MILTON and LZ HERFORD while the fourth battalion remained at LZ SAVOY as the brigade reserve/reaction force. Although numerous VC bodies and a large quantity of equipment were discovered on the battle field there was only light isolated contact reported during the day.

(2) 1/5 Cav: D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ HERFORD with A Company, 1/12 Cav. At 0635 hours C Company, which had spent the night vicinity BR 688636, moved along the ridge to the northeast to vicinity BR 694645. At 0754 A Company moved overland from LZ MONKEY to BR 694645 where the company linked up with C Company at 1615 hours. B Company which had been located at LZ HORSE, swept through the area where A and B Companies, 2/12 Cav, had been in heavy contact the previous day. Vicinity BR 694643 the company discovered several VC bodies, one damaged 60mm mortar, and numerous items of equipment. The company continued to sweep north and at 1706 hours joined A and C Companies vicinity BR 697643. At 1915 hours D Company and the Battalion CP reported receiving mortar and small arms fire vicinity LZ HERFORD. By 2000 hours the firing had ceased and the VC withdrew.

(3) 2/8 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to secure artillery positions vicinity SAVOY and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force. A Company remained attached to 1/12 Cav until 0817 hours when the company was detached and returned to SAVOY at approximately 1030 hours. B Company, 1/12 Cav, which had been attached to the battalion in the base camp was detached at 0730 hours and rejoined the 1/12 Cav at LZ COBRA.

(4) 1/12 Cav: A Company remained at LZ HERFORD with D Company and the battalion CP of the 1/5 Cav. C Company spent the day improving LZ MILTON and conducting local security patrols around the landing zone. B Company was detached from the 2/8 Cav at 0730 hours and was airlifted from the base area to LZ COBRA closing at 0920 hours. A Company, 2/8 Cav, was detached at 0817 and returned to their parent battalion at SAVOY. The battalion CP and D Company remained at LZ COBRA with elements of D Company patrolling the high ground to the west of COBRA during the day. At 1915 hours A Company, at LZ HERFORD reported receiving several mortar rounds.

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(5) 2/12 Cav: The battalion spent the better part of the day polioing the battlefield vicinity BR 694635. In that general area A and B Companies counted 15 VC bodies and observed 20-30 places covered with large quantities of blood which indicated that the VC had removed additional bodies from the area. One 60mm mortar and numerous items of equipment were also discovered. Following the police of the area A and B Companies returned to LZ HORSE. C Company moved during the day from LZ HORSE up a trail to the northeast and stopped for the night vicinity BR 698636. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ COBRA. The only contact reported occurred at LZ HORSE at 1450 hours when a VC sniper fired several rounds at personnel on the LZ and withdrew.

e. 20 May 66 (Incl # 9)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade, utilizing four infantry battalions and one Air Cavalry Squadron (-) continued to search for VC elements remaining within the assigned area of operations. One battalion began to sweep to the north of the area of contact. A second battalion was relieved by a fresh battalion from the division base area. The Air Cavalry Squadron screened the flanks and secured an artillery battery which was lifted into the SUOI CA Valley while the remaining two infantry battalions secured installations in the VINH PHANG VALLEY and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force.

(2) 1/5 Cav: Commencing at 0658 hours, A, B and C Companies began moving overland toward LZ APE (BR 698650). The companies arrived at the landing zone at 0848 hours and spent the remainder of the day improving the landing zone and conducting local security patrols in the immediate area. At 1410 hours the AT platoon lifted off LZ HERFORD and air assaulted LZ MORTIMER (BR 698687). The remainder of the battalion CP and D Company followed the AT platoon, closing in the landing zone at 1645 hours. There was no contact reported during the day; however at 2014 hours a small VC element began to probe LZ MORTIMER with grenades and small arms fire. The probe continued until approximately 2115 hours when the enemy withdrew with unknown losses.

(3) 1/8 Cav: At 1210 hours the battalion was released from attachment to the 3rd Brigade and rejoined to the 1st Brigade. The first elements of the battalion departed the division base camp at 1308 hours and by 1600 hours the entire battalion had closed in LZ HORSE having assumed the responsibility of that area from the 2/12 Cav at 1545 hours. From LZ HORSE C Company swept northeast to BR 698635 where the company remained overnight.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion remained at SAVOY during the day providing security for artillery and command installations and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force. At 1230 hours the recon platoon was attached to the 1/9 Cav Squadron.

(5) 1/12 Cav: C Company remained at LZ MILTON conducting local security patrolling throughout the day. A Company continued to patrol the area surrounding LZ HERFORD. At 2000 hours the company received sniper fire which continued until 2059 hours when the snipers withdrew. B Company, at 1017 hours, lifted off LZ COBRA and air assaulted a landing zone vicinity BR 643500 from where the company swept overland to the south. At BR 656516 the company was extracted and closed back into LZ COBRA at 1825 hours. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ COBRA.

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(6) 2/12 Cav: Shortly after sunrise C Company began to move up the valley trail to the northeast of LZ HORSE. At 0645 hours vicinity BR 697634 the company came under sniper fire. As the company continued to move it encountered an estimated VC squad armed with one light machine gun. AAA and artillery were placed on the VC element and the company continued to advance. At 0955 hours the company discovered an estimated company size bivouac area vicinity BR 701638. At this time the battalion was informed that it would be relieved by the 1/8 Cav and C Company was instructed to rejoin A and B Companies at LZ HORSE. The first elements of the battalion were relieved of responsibility for LZ HORSE by the 1/8 Cav and at 1655 hours the last elements of the battalion closed the division base camp. On closing the pass area the battalion was detached from 1st Brigade control.

(7) 1/9 Cav (-): The squadron (-) was attached to the brigade effective 192400 hours. Throughout the day the Air Cavalry troops of the squadron continually screened the SWOI CA VALLEY and the lower CRO'S FOOT area. At 1330 hours D Troop air assaulted LZ FOEEL (BR 825602) to secure positions for B Battery, 2/19 Artillery which closed at 1400 hours. At 1345 hours the recon platoon 2/8 Cav which had been attached to the squadron landed at BR 790575 and encountered an estimated VC platoon. The recon platoon was reinforced by a platoon from D Troop and the VC withdrew leaving several bodies in the area.

f. 21 May 66 (Incl #10)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to search its assigned area of operations with two battalions sweeping to the north and east. Two other battalions secured artillery positions and provided the Brigade reserve reaction force. During the day the elements pushing east engaged and destroyed a company size VC force. A mortar platoon from one of the reserve battalions was overrun on LZ HERFORD during the afternoon.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0835 hours A Company was airlifted from LZ APE to LZ MORTIMER closing at 1010 hours. B and C Companies began to sweep toward LZ MORTIMER overland from LZ APE at 1000 hours. Sporadic sniper fire was encountered during the day by both elements and by dark B Company was located at BR 694672 and C Company at BR 702671. At 1410 hours the AT platoon and one platoon from A Company were airlifted to LZ COML (BR 733700). Once the landing zone was secured C Battery, 2/19 artillery was airlifted into the position, D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ MORTIMER.

(3) 1/8 Cav: Shortly after first light B and C Companies of the battalion began to sweep up the trail in the valley to the northeast of LZ HORSE. At 1547 hours B Company which was leading the sweep engaged an estimated VC company in the vicinity of BR 710635. The contact continued until at dark B Company attacked and overrun the VC position at BR 708636. A search of the area revealed 51 VC KIA (BC) and numerous weapons. B and C Companies and the battalion CP remained at LZ HORSE.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion less the recon platoon remained in brigade reserve at SVOY. At 1609 hours A Company was attached to 1/12 Cav.

(5) 1/12 Cav: After sunrise C Company swept west along the ridge from LZ MILTON to LZ HERFORD closing at 1235 hours. The company returned to 1/12 control at 1100 hours. A Company was airlifted from LZ HERFORD to the division base camp where at 1156 hours the company was attached to the 3rd Bde.

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The remainder of the battalion was located at LZ COBRA. At 1455 hours the mortar platoon of C Company, which had remained at LZ HERFORD while the rifle platoons swept down the ridge to the west, was attacked and overrun by a company size VC force. C Company returned to the landing zone as rapidly as possible but was unable to make contact with the VC force. The company remained at LZ HERFORD. A Company, 2/8 Cav, was attached to the battalion and was airlifted from SAVOY to LZ HERFORD closing at 1657 hours. From HERFORD the company swept to the north but was not able to overtake the VC company prior to dark. B Company, 1/12 Cav, was airlifted into LZ MILTON from LZ COBRA closing at 1605 hours. From LZ MILTON the company swept west in an effort to block the VC force which had hit LZ HERFORD. At dusk the company was located vicinity BR 673620.

(6) 1/9 Cav: The Squadron (-) continued to screen the north and east of the area of operations with ground elements employed on likely enemy routes of egress. D Troop (-) continued to secure B Battery, 2/19 Arty at LZ HOTEL.

G. 22 May (Incl #11)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to sweep to the north and east with two battalions. Elements of the third battalion continued to search the area vicinity LZ HERFORD. The fourth battalion remained as the brigade reserve/reaction force at SAVOY.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0702 hours B and C Companies continued to sweep toward LZ MORTIMER with C Company closing LZ MORTIMER at 1155 hours and B Company closing shortly thereafter. Following the closure of B and C Companies into LZ MORTIMER A Company began to sweep to the north and at dark was located vicinity BR 700702. At 1600 hours B Company air assaulted LZ HARVARD (BR 703724) closing at 1717 hours. C Company and the battalion CP were airlifted from LZ MORTIMER to LZ CORAL closing at 1751 hours. The battalion reported negative enemy contact during the day.

(3) 1/8 Cav: At 0530 hours the elements of the battalion located at LZ HORSE reported a light VC probe. B and C Companies spent the morning hours evacuating their wounded and policing the scene of the previous night's contact. At 1140 hours C Company encountered an estimated VC squad vicinity BR 710637. Both B and C Companies continued to push to the northeast against light, widely scattered, VC resistance. C Company, 2/8 Cav, lifted off SAVOY at 1205 hours and touched down at LZ BULL (BR 720645) at 1211 hours. At 1355 hours the company was attached to the 1/8 Cav. During the afternoon B and C Companies moved toward the block established by C Company, 2/8 Cav, and by dark were located within 500 meters of the blocking position. A Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ HORSE.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to secure the brigade base and provide a reserve/reaction force. At 1205 hours C Company air assaulted LZ BULL and was attached to the 1/8 Cav effective 1355 hours. A Company, in the meantime had swept down the valley to the north of LZ HERFORD and was reattached to the battalion at 1640 hours when the company closed SAVOY.

(5) 1/12 Cav: At 0340 hours A Company, 2/8 Cav, which was attached to the battalion reported receiving small arms fire at BR 661631. The firing continued for approximately forty minutes before the VC withdrew leaving behind 2 VC KIA (DC).

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At sunrise A Company, 2/8 Cav, swept along the stream north of LZ HERFORD toward the VINH THANH VALLEY. At 1640 hours the company closed the brigade base and was detached from the 1/12 Cav. B and C Companies conducted search operations during the day vicinity LZ HERFORD until 1500 hours when C Company (-) lifted off LZ HERFORD and closed LZ COBRA at 1530 hours. B Company followed C Company and closed LZ COBRA at 1730 hours. One platoon from C Company remained in the immediate vicinity of LZ HERFORD overnight in an effort to ambush any VC that might return to the landing zone. The remainder of the battalion was located at LZ COBRA throughout the day. At 2250 hours approximately 16 mortar rounds landed near the battalion position at LZ COBRA however there were no casualties reported.

(6) 1/9 Cav (-): The squadron continued to screen the north and east portions of the area of operations. D Troop provided security for the artillery batteries located at LZ HOTEL

1. 23 May 1966 (Incl # 12)

(1) General: The brigade continued to search for VC elements located within the area of operations with three battalions. The fourth battalion remained in reserve vicinity SAVOY prepared to exploit any enemy contacts.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0650 hours C Company began to sweep northwest along the valley from LZ CORAL to LZ HARVARD. At BR 720728 the company discovered fresh elephant tracks but was not able to locate the animals. The company joined B Company at LZ HARVARD at 1555 hours. A Company continued to move overland from their overnight position north of LZ MORTIMER toward LZ HARVARD closing LZ HARVARD during the early afternoon. At 1617 hours B Company was airlifted from LZ HARVARD to LZ CORAL to provide security for the battalion CP and the artillery battery at that location.

(3) 1/8 Cav: At 0834 hours A Company commenced to move by air from LZ HORSE to LZ STEER to join C Company 2/8 Cav. After one platoon had been moved the weather conditions deteriorated and the company (-) remained at LZ HORSE. B and C Companies moved to vicinity BR 708642 and BR 727635 respectively in search of two suspected VC hospitals. Although the companies spent the entire day conducting the search the hospitals were not found. C Company 2/8 Cav remained vicinity LZ STEER and conducted extensive daylight patrolling around the landing zone. A Company (-), D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ HORSE.

(4) 2/8 Cav: C Company remained attached to 1/8 Cav. At 1705 hours A Company lifted off SAVOY and touched down at LZ CLEMSON (BR 789670) at 1718 hours with negative enemy contact. The battalion (-) followed A Company into LZ CLEMSON closing at 1841 hours and consolidated for the night.

(5) 1/12 Cav (-): The battalion (-) remained at LZ COBRA providing the brigade reserve/reaction force. The AT platoon continued to secure B Battery, 3/18 Artillery vicinity BR 615632. At 1325 hours the platoon of C Company which had established an ambush site vicinity LZ HERFORD was extracted and rejoined the battalion at LZ COBRA.

1/9 Cav (-): D Troop continued to occupy LZ HOTEL while B and C Troops continued to screen to the north and east of the area of operations.

1. 24 May 66 (Incl # 13)

(6) General: The four battalions of the brigade moved to establish blocking positions surrounding the area of operations. Maximum use was made of daylight patrols and night ambush sites between positions while all available TAC Air and arty were directed against likely enemy targets within the ring formed by the battalions in an effort to flush out the remaining VC elements.

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(2) 1/5 Cav: A and C Companies remained at LZ HARVARD while the remainder of the battalion was located at LZ CORAL. The battalion conducted extensive patrolling in both areas and established seven platoon size ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(3) 1/8 Cav: At 0720 hours C Company, 2/8 Cav, was extracted from LZ STEER to LZ CLEMSON closing at 0849 hours. The company was reattached to the 2/8 Cav at that time. At 0828 hours the battalion commenced movement by air from LZ HORSE and LZ BULL for SAVOY closing at 1245 hours. From SAVOY the battalion was redeployed at 1412 hours to LZ COLT (BR 746517) closing at 1600 hours. From LZ COLT elements of the battalion established six platoon size ambush sites during the night.

(4) 2/3 Cav: C Company returned to control of the battalion at 0849 hours. During the day A Company conducted platoon size patrols in the vicinity of the battalion base at LZ CLEMSON. A total of five platoon size ambush sites were established.

(5) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) remained in the vicinity of SAVOY securing the brigade base and artillery positions. At 1750 hours B Company was airlifted into LZ ORANGE (BR 664514) and C Company into LZ GRAPE (BR 639572) and PEAR (BR 644556). From these locations the two companies established a total of six ambush sites.

(6) 1/9 Cav (-): The sqdn (-) continued to secure LZ HOTEL with elements of D Troop while B and C Troops continued to screen to the north, east and south of the area of operations. At 2057 hours vicinity BR 804635 a platoon of D Troop ambushed a group of VC resulting in 15 VC KIA (BG) and four weapons captured, one of which was an M-16.

J. 25 May 66

(1) General: The brigade continued to occupy blocking positions with four infantry battalions and one Air Cavalry Squadron (-) while maximum use was made of TAC Air and artillery against suspected VC positions. Between 1800 and 1840 hours two B-52 strikes were conducted against suspected VC strongholds.

(2) 1/5 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy LZ HARVARD and LZ CORAL with all elements conducting small unit patrols during daylight hours and establishing ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(3) 1/8 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy ambush sites and conducted platoon size patrols in the vicinity of LZ COLT.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy LZ CLEMSON while the rifle companies conducted extensive small unit patrolling and established ambush sites in the area north and south of LZ CLEMSON.

(5) 1/12 Cav: B and C Companies continued to occupy blocking positions vicinity LZ PEAR, LZ ORANGE and LZ GRAPE. The battalion (-) provided security for command and artillery elements located at LZ COBRA and SAVOY. At 1325 hours A Company closed LZ COBRA and returned to battalion control.

(6) 1/9 Cav (-): The squadron (-) conducted screening operations between established blocking positions, occupied ambush sites and conducted small unit patrols in the vicinity of LZ HOTEL.

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k. 26 May 66 (Incl #14)

(1) General: The battalions of the brigade continued to block likely routes of egress from the operational area while four CIDG Companies were delivered into the center of the ring formed to locate any remaining VC elements. Maximum artillery and TAC Air strikes were placed on probable VC concentrations.

(2) 1/5 Cav: The battalion continued to conduct saturation patrolling during daylight hours and established platoon size ambush sites during the hours of darkness. At 1234 hours the battalion was alerted to have a company prepared to assist the 241 CIDG Company which was then in contact vicinity LZ MONKEY. At 1740 hours the CIDG Company reported that it was heavily engaged. A company lifted off LZ CORAL at 1758 hours for LZ BUSILL. The first aircraft attempted to land received AW fire from three directions and because of darkness and remaining fuel in the aircraft the mission was aborted. While still airborne the company was diverted to LZ MONKEY. The second aircraft into LZ MONKEY was hit on the landing zone and further attempts to reinforce the CIDG element were delayed until the following morning.

(3) 1/8 Cav: The battalion remained at LZ COLT with the rifle companies conducting extensive daylight patrols and establishing ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to conduct daylight patrols in sector and established ambush sites prior to dark.

(5) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at SAVOY providing security for installations and artillery positions and furnished the brigade reserve/reaction force. B and C Companies remained vicinity LZ ORANGE, LZ PEAR and LZ GRAPE conducting daylight patrols and establishing six platoon size ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(6) 1/9 Cav: The squadron (-) continued to secure artillery positions at LZ HOTEL and conducted aerial reconnaissance between blocking positions.

(7) CIDG: At 0750 hours the 241 CIDG Company was airlifted into LZ MONKEY. The 242 Company closed LZ HORSE at 0807 hours and the 236 Company closed LZ BULL at 0828 hours. The 240 Company closed LZ MORTIMER at 0930 hours. The 241 Company sweeping north from LZ MONKEY encountered a large VC force and fell back to the landing zone at 1230 hours. At 1300 hours the VC broke contact until 1740 hours when the company again reported they were in heavy contact. An effort was made to reinforce the company by the 1/5 Cav, however, the second ship into LZ MONKEY was disabled by ground fire. The VC again broke contact at approximately 1900 hours. The other three CIDG Companies reported negative enemy contact during the day.

l. 27 May 66 (Incl #15)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to occupy blocking positions surrounding the area of operations with four battalions and one air cavalry squadron (-). During the afternoon an ARVN battalion replaced the air cavalry squadron and a ROK battalion replaced one infantry battalion which began to redeploy to the northern portion of the area of operations. Poor weather in the operational area prevented the completion of the redeployment prior to dark.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0846 hours B Company began to move from its overnight position toward LZ BUSILL closing that location at 1332 hours. On receiving word that LZ BUSILL was secured C Company was airlifted from LZ HARVARD to LZ BUSILL closing at 1539 hours. A Company was then airlifted from LZ CORAL to LZ BUSILL closing at 1842 hours followed by D Company and the battalion CP which closed LZ BUSILL at 1918 hours. The entire battalion remained at LZ BUSILL during the night. At 1930 hours OCA of A Company, 1/8 Cav, located at LZ CORAL was passed to the battalion.

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CRAZY HORSE

27 May (incl 15)

(1) General: 1st Brigade continues to occupy blocking positions around area of operations with four battalions and one air cavalry squadron.

(2) 1/5 Cav: B/1/5th Cav and Recon Platoon airlifted into LZ HOTEL along with 0018. Recon platoon secures LZ with B/1/5 conducting search operation to the southwest from LZ at 0100. At 1600 hours, B/1/5 found cache of ammunition and medical supplies. Recon platoon extracted back to LZ HOTEL at 1800 hours. A and C/1/5 remain at LZ HOTEL with battalion () at LZ GOLF.

(3) 1/8th Cav: Battalion conducted patrols and ambushes in area MONKEY. Battalion CP remaining at LZ GOLF. At 0120 hours received heavy mortar fire at LZ GOLF. Arty called in results nil.

(4) 2/8th Cav: This battalion continued to conduct patrols in sector and established ambush sites prior to dark. Negative contact reported.

(5) 1/12th Cav: Provided security for installations at MONKEY and furnished brigade reserve/reaction force. No change in unit locations.

(6) 1/9th Cav: Continued to secure LZ HOTEL and conduct aerial reconnaissance of area. B/1/9 received enemy probe at 2030 hours. Arty called, negative results.

(7) CIDG: Patrol reports finding 25 VC bodies via 88679846. All units searching south from initial positions. 241 company was extracted from LZ MONKEY to SAVOY at 1647 hours. Scattered contact reported throughout the day.

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(3) 1/8 Cav: The battalion closed back into LZ COLF during the morning hours and prepared for redeployment to LZ CORAL upon relief by the ROK Battalion. Unfavorable weather conditions prevented this movement until 1710 hours when the first elements of A Company lifted off for LZ CORAL. The company closed LZ CORAL at 1840 hours. At that time the decision was made to discontinue the movement until the following morning. A Company was attached to 1/5 Cav effective 1930 hours.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to conduct saturation patrols and establish sites vicinity LZ CLEMSON.

(5) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to secure command posts and artillery positions vicinity LZ CORAL and SAVOY. B and C Companies continued to conduct patrols and established ambush sites vicinity LZ PEAR, LZ GRAPE and LZ ORANGE.

(6) 1/9 Cav: The squadron (-) continued to secure artillery positions at LZ HOTEL until 1500 hours when they were relieved by TASK FORCE BRAVO (ARVN). The squadron CP moved to PHU CAT. B and C Troops continued to search the entire brigade area of operations during daylight hours.

(7) CIDG: Three CIDG Companies continued to search within the ring formed by U.S. and allied forces. The 241st CIDG Company was extracted from LZ MONKEY at 1647 hours and returned to SAVOY.

(8) 2/1 Cav (ROK): At 1445 hours the 6th Company closed LZ BRAVO (BR 765460) and the 7th Company closed LZ CHARLIE (BR 745735) at 1520 hours. The remainder of the battalion closed into LZ COLF prior to 1700 hours.

(9) Task Force Bravo (ARVN): Task Force Bravo composed of two scout companies, one airborne company, and one armored personnel carrier company, relieved the 1/9 Cav of responsibility for the security of LZ HOTEL. The Task Force (-) remained at LZ HOTEL and the scout companies moved to BR 787613 and BR 778585 prior to dark.

m. 29 May 66 (Incl 16)

(1) General: The brigade continued to block routes of egress from the area of operations utilizing four U.S. Battalions, one air cavalry squadron (-) and ROK battalion and an ARVN TASK FORCE of four companies. Three CIDG companies continued to search the center of the ring with light contact reported during the day. Maximum artillery and TIC ADR were delivered on likely VC locations.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0720 hours A and C Companies began to sweep southwest from LZ BUSIL to LZ JOE closing prior to 1500 hours. From LZ JOE the two companies conducted platoon size patrols with all elements returning to LZ JOE prior to dark. The remainder of the battalion was located at LZ BUSIL with B Company conducting patrols around that location during the day.

(3) 1/8 Cav: At 0702 hours D Company and the battalion CP lifted off LZ COLF and closed LZ CORAL at 0830 hours. B and C Companies lifted off LZ COLF at 0900 hours and closed LZ HARVARD at 0953 hours. From LZ HARVARD C Company patrolled to the west and B Company conducted patrols to the southeast. Both elements established ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(4) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy ambush sites and conducted saturation patrols vicinity LZ CLEMSON.

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(5) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to secure LZ COBRA and SIVVOY while B and C Companies occupied ambush sites and conducted patrols in the vicinity of LZ GRABE, LZ PARR and LZ ORANGE.

(6) 1/9 Cav: The squadron (-) continued to operate in support of the brigade by conducting extensive aerial patrolling between blocking positions which the battalions had established. The squadron CP remained at PEN GAT.

(7) CIDG: Three CIDG companies continued to conduct search operations within sector while one CIDG company remained at SIVVOY.

(8) 2/2 Cav (RKM): The battalion continued to occupy LZ COLT, LZ GALLIE, and LZ BRAVO conducted small unit patrols and established ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(9) Task Force Bravo (AYVN): The Task Force occupied blocking positions with two scout companies while two companies remained at LZ HOWEL securing artillery.

a. 30 May 66 (Incl 17)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to block likely routes of access from the operational area utilizing four U.S. Battalions, one Aerial Cav Squadron, one Task Force, and one ROK Battalion. Three CIDG companies and a portion of one U.S. Battalion continued to sweep the encircled area in an effort to dislodge any remaining VC elements.

(2) 1/5 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ BUSHILL. A and B Companies conducted platoon size patrols during the day into the areas south and west of LZ JOE. All patrols returned to LZ JOE prior to dark.

(3) 1/8 Cav: The battalion conducted extensive patrolling in sector during daylight hours and established platoon size ambushes during the hours of darkness. The battalion (-) was located at LZ CORAL. B and C Companies were located at LZ HARVARD.

(4) 2/8 Cav: At 0632 hours C Company air assaulted LZ WELLSLEY (BR 725673) and swept east back to LZ CLIMBSON closing prior to dark. B Company touched down on LZ VIBBER (BR 770658) at 0700 hours and swept overland to LZ DYER (BR 762651). D Company continued to secure the battalion CP at LZ CLIMBSON throughout the day.

(5) 1/12 Cav: D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ COBRA. At 1500 hours A Company was airlifted to LZ ORANGE where the company relieved B Company which returned to LZ COBRA. C Company continued to conduct daylight patrols and established night ambush sites vicinity LZ's GRABE and PARR.

(6) CIDG: Three CIDG Companies continued search operations within the encircled area. At 1715 hours the 236th CIDG Company reported heavy enemy contact vicinity BR 720622. A Company 1/8 was airlifted from LZ CORAL 1411 and air assaulted a LZ vicinity BR 721518. The company touched down in the landing zone at 1820 hours and the VC broke contact with the CIDG company shortly thereafter.

(7) Task Force Bravo (AYVN): The Task Force (-) continued to provide security for artillery positions at LZ HOWEL and provided a reaction force for the two scout companies which occupied blocking positions in the valleys to the west.

(8) 2/1 Cav (RKM): The battalion continued to occupy LZ COLT, LZ GALLIE and LZ BRAVO. At approximately 0900 hours an estimated VC company was observed in the vicinity of BR 810490. Two platoons were airlifted into the area and the VC element withdrew into the hills to the west. The RKM force continued to search for the VC force throughout the day with no contact reported.

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o. 31 May 66 (Incl 13)

(1) General: The brigade continued to block likely escape routes from the area of operations during the day. One U.S. Battalion was extracted from the area of operation as were the three CIDG Companies.

(2) 1/5 Cav: At 0700 the first elements of B Company lifted off LZ BUSILL for the base camp at AN KIE. D Company and the battalion CP followed closing out of LZ BUSILL at 0935 hours. At 1013 hours A and C Companies lifted off LZ JOE and closed to division base at 1305 hours. At that time the battalion reverted to 2nd Brigade control.

(3) 1/8 Cav: A Company remained vicinity BR 721619 during the night. At 0700 hours the company began to move to the north in an effort to locate the VC force which had been in contact with the CIDG Company the night before. The company moved overland to LZ HORSE where they were extracted at 1830 hours and returned to LZ CORAL. At 1220 hours the first elements of C Company lifted off LZ TAVARD and touched down at JOE taking responsibility for the security of the landing zone from the 1/5 Cav at 1247 hours. The company closed LZ JOE at 1320 hours followed by B Company which closed at 1356 hours. C Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ CORAL.

(4) 2/8 Cav: At 1153 hours C Company air assaulted LZ POINT (BR 763681) and LZ DARNMOUTH with negative enemy contact reported. The elements of the company remained vicinity the landing zones during the day and established ambush sites during the hours of darkness. B Company swept from LZ DUKE during the day and nightfall the company closed back into LZ CLIFTON. At 1834 hours A Company lifted off LZ CLIFTON and closed LZ SMITH at 1852 hours. The company remained vicinity the landing zone during the hours of darkness. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ CLIFTON.

(5) 1/12 Cav: The battalion continued to provide security for SAVOY and LZ COBRA. A and C Companies continued to conduct patrols and established ambush sites vicinity LZ PEAR, LZ GRAPE and LZ ORANGE.

(6) CIDG: The three CIDG Companies concluded their search operations with last company being extracted from LZ HORSE to SAVOY at 1811 hours.

(7) Task Force Bravo (RVN): The battalion continued to occupy blocking positions with two scout companies while the remainder of the battalion provided security for artillery batteries located at LZ ROSEL.

(8) 1/12 Cav (ROK): At 0047 hours the 6th Company located at LZ BRAVO came under mortar attack. The attack ceased after 20-25 rounds had been fired and ROK casualties were reported as light. Throughout the day elements of the battalion continued to conduct patrols around LZ COLE, LZ CHARLIE and LZ BRAVO. Ambush sites were established during the hours of darkness.

p. 1 June 66 (Incl 19)

(1) General: The brigade continued to conduct offensive operations in assigned sector employing three U.S. battalions and one ROK battalion. The RVN Task Force BRAVO withdrew from the area of operations to participate in an RVN operation which was to be conducted northwest of PHUOIT. The Air Cavalry Squadron (-) was also detached from brigade control leaving one Air Cavalry Troop to support the 1st Brigade.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ CORAL, B and C Companies conducted daylight patrols in the area south of LZ JOE with negative enemy contact reported. All patrols returned to LZ JOE prior to dark.

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(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0920 hours C Company was extracted from LZ POINT and LZ DARTMOUTH, air assaulted LZ VASSAR (BR 770658) and swept to LZ CLEMSON closing at 1824 hours. A Company remained vicinity LZ SMITH conducting local patrols throughout the day. The battalion CP remained at LZ CLEMSON with B Company conducting local security patrols around that location.

(4) 1/12 Cav: At 1230 hours A Company was airlifted to LZ COBRA. The company remained at that location throughout the day providing the brigade reaction force. At 1305 hours one platoon from B Company touched down at LZ ECHO closing at 1315 hours. B Company (-) closed LZ FOXTROT at 1335 hours. The battalion (-) closed LZ HOTEL during the early afternoon hours and C Company established platoon size ambush sites during the hours of darkness. The 105th Scout Company (ARVN) remained at LZ HOTEL assisting in the security of the position.

(5) 2/1 Cav (ROK): At 0755 hours the 6th Company air assaulted LZ ALPHA and at 0925 the 7th Company assaulted LZ CHARLIE. Both companies reported light contact during the day while conducting patrols around the landing zones. The ROK battalion CP remained at LZ COLT.

(6) Task Force Bravo (ARVN): All elements of the Task Force with the exception of one scout company departed the operational area upon relief by the 1/12 Cav vicinity of LZ HOTEL.

q. 2 June 66 (Incl #20)

(1) General: The brigade continued to conduct search operations in the high ground between the VINH THANH Valley and the SOUI CA Valley employing three US battalions, one ROK battalion, one Air Cavalry Troop and one ARVN scout company.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ CORAL with the recon platoon sweeping to the north and A Company conducting patrols to the east and west of the landing zone. B and C Companies located at LZ JOE continued to sweep the area surrounding the landing zone with negative enemy contact reported.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0725 hours the recon platoon air assaulted LZ WELLESLEY (BR 724671) and swept south to LZ STEER. At 1422 hours the platoon was lifted from LZ STEER to LZ CRATER (BR 721619). B Company air assaulted into LZ POTHOLE (BR 743620) at 0742 hours and conducted patrols to the north and south of the landing zone during the day. C Company lifted off LZ CLEMSON at 0848 hours and closed LZ CRATER at 0920 hours. A and D Companies and the battalion CP followed C Company closing at 1127 hours. From LZ CRATER A Company swept to the northwest and at dark was located vicinity BR711629. C Company conducted patrols to the north and south of LZ CRATER during the afternoon.

(4) 1/12 Cav: A Company continued to secure artillery and command installations vicinity LZ COBRA. The battalion (-) remained vicinity LZ HOTEL. All units established ambush sites in sector during the hours of darkness.

(5) 2/1 Cav (ROK): Elements of the battalion continued to sweep to the northwest during the day with sporadic contact reported. At 1800 hours the 6th Company was located vicinity BR735593 and the 7th Company vicinity BR737563. The battalion (-) remained at LZ COLT.

r. 3 June 66 (Incl #21)

(1) General: The brigade continued to search the high ground east of the VINH THANH Valley employing three US battalions and one ROK battalion.

(2) 1/8 Cav: At 0723 hours A Company was lifted off LZ CORAL and closed LZ MILTON. From LZ MILTON the company swept west along the ridge line to LZ HERFORD where the company established defensive positions for the night.

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At 1515 hours D Company and the battalion CP closed SAVOY having been airlifted from LZ CORAL. B and C Companies swept southwest from LZ JOE during the day and at dusk were located vicinity BR 652647 and BR 633661 respectively.

(3) 2/8 Cav: All elements of the battalions continued to conduct platoon size patrolling during the day vicinity LZ CRATER and LZ POTHOLE. Ambush sites were established during the hours of darkness.

(4) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ HOTEL with B and C Companies conducting local patrols and establishing ambush sites during the hours of darkness in the area to the north and west of the LZ HOTEL. A Company continued to secure artillery and command facilities vicinity LZ COBRA.

(5) 2/1 Cav (ROK): The battalion (-) remained vicinity LZ COIT while the 6th and 7th companies pushed to the north. At 1500 hours the two companies made contact with a reinforced VC company vicinity BR 732603. The contact continued throughout the afternoon with the ROK companies driving the VC elements to the north.

s. 4 June 66 (Incl # 22)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to search the area of operations with three U.S. Battalions and one ROK Battalion.

(2) 1/8 Cav: Shortly after sunrise the three rifle companies of the battalion continued to sweep toward the VINH THANH Valley. B and C Companies were extracted from BR 627647 and closed SAVOY at 1330 hours. The entire battalion was located at SAVOY providing security for artillery and command installations at dusk.

(3) 2/8 Cav: All companies of the battalion remained vicinity LZ CRATER and LZ POTHOLE establishing blocking positions to prevent the VC force which the ROK Battalion had engaged from escaping to the north. Contact during the day was sporadic.

(4) 1/12 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ HOTEL. At 0729 hours A Company lifted off LZ COBRA and air assaulted LZ PEAK (BR 773642). From LZ PEAK the company swept to the west in an effort to locate a 180 man VC force which a rallier had reported to be in the area. The company was unable to locate the VC force and remained vicinity BR 754636 for the night. C Company swept west from LZ HOTEL during the day and returned to LZ HOTEL prior to dark.

(5) 2/1 Cav (ROK): The 6th and 7th Companies continued to search for remnants of the VC force which had been encountered on the previous day vicinity BR 732603. The battalion (-) remained vicinity LZ COIT.

t. 5 June 66 (Incl # 23)

(1) General: The 1st Airborne Brigade concluded Operation CRAZY HORSE with the extraction of three battalions by air and one battalion overland. All units closed their respective base areas prior to 1900 hours.

(2) 1/8 Cav: Commencing at 0855 hours the battalion minus C Company began a motor movement from LZ COBRA back to AN KHE closing prior to noon. C Company continued to provide the brigade reaction force until all elements had cleared the operational area. The company then moved overland to AN KHE closing at 1836 hours.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0650 hours the first elements of D Company departed LZ CRATER and closed LZ MUSTANG at 0740 hours. The company was followed by B and C Companies and the battalion CP which closed AN KHE at 0925 hours. B Company moved overland to LZ POTHOLE, was attached to 1/12 Cav and conducted a sweep east to LZ HOTEL. The company was extracted from LZ HOTEL and closed AN KHE at 1833 hours.

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(4) 1/12 Cav: All elements of the battalion closed LZ HOTEL during the morning hours and prepared for extraction back to the division base. At 1250 hours B Company lifted off LZ HOTEL and closed LZ NU SRANG at 1314 hours. The remainder of the battalion, and B Company, 2/3 Cav, which was extracted from LZ HOTEL, followed B Company and closed AN KHE at 1333 hours.

(5) 2/1 Cav (ROK): The battalion was released from OCA to the 1st Cavalry Division and was airlifted to its base area during the afternoon hours.

12. RESULTS:

- a. U.S. Losses:
 - (1) KIA 71
 - (2) MIA 258
 - (3) MIA 1
- b. Enemy Losses:
 - (1) Personnel:

	<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	346	123	34	4	507
KIA (RST)	331		50		381
MIA (RST)	173		2		175
VCC	24	2		2	28
VCS	105	3		6	114

- (2) Weapons:
 - Individual Weapons 97
 - Crew Served Weapons 17
- (3) Ammunition:
 - Small Arms 27,077 rnds
 - 60mm 47 rnds
 - 81mm 29 rnds
 - RR Ammo 33 rnds
 - Grenades 228
 - Mines 14
 - Bandoler Torpedoes 5

- (4) Miscellaneous Equipment:
 - PRC-10 Radio 3
 - Rice 90,025 lbs
 - Salt 20,875 lbs
 - Medical Supplies 240 lbs
 - Mortar Fuses 10
 - Blasting Caps 54
 - Detonators 1
 - Explosives 30 1/2 lbs
 - Binoculars 2
 - Compass 2
 - Signal Flares 8
 - Documents 260 lbs
 - Uniforms 350
 - Packs 106
 - Weapons Repair Shop 1 (Destroyed)

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13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. The 1st Forward Support Element (FSE) supported Operation CRAZY HORSE from locations in the Division base and at PHU CAT. Maximum use was made of all available transportation to support the large expenditures of artillery ammunition. A ground LOC was established from SUI NHON to PHU CAT and LZ SAVOY and from the Division Base into LZ SAVOY. The ground LOC was used primarily to move the heavier rounds of 155mm, 8" Howitzer, and 175mm ammunition. The primary means of resupply was an air LOC from the supply points at the Division Base and PHU CAT to the using units. Because of the high expenditure rate of artillery ammunition the FSE supply handlers had to be assisted by personnel of the other FSE's and the main supply company. In future operations ammunition handlers from the general support artillery units should be used to supplement the FSE.

b. Weather became a factor which had to be continuously considered. Many times weather reduced the hours during a day during which supplies could be air delivered. This required a change in aircraft allocation to the FSE. Instead of a small number of aircraft during the whole day the FSE required larger numbers of aircraft during the shortened periods of flyable weather.

c. An old lesson was relearned. The need for a winch system on the medical evacuation helicopters is urgently required. The absence of these caused a CH-47 to be utilized in a standby role to lift casualties out of inaccessible areas thus causing poor utilization of one CH-47.

d. The KY-8 secure voice radio equipment was utilized for the first time by the brigade on the division command net (D-1). The existence of the equipment provides the brigade commander with a direct secure radio circuit to the division commander for the discussion of future plans and courses of action without having to resort to liaison visits or secure teletype messages.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES USED:

a. When brigade units were pulled back into blocking positions surrounding the suspected locations of the enemy force, the area was so extensive that physical occupation of the entire area was not possible. As an economy of force measure it was decided to employ a CS barrier along a five kilometer sector that appeared to be a likely route of egress. A powdered CS barrier 1000 feet wide was desired. An UH-1D helicopter was equipped with two M-5 dispensers and achieved the desired coverage. Due to intermittent rains the CS barrier had to be replenished one time. Low level dissemination by the M-5 dispenser is a proven method of establishing a dense CS coverage. There was no evidence of any enemy withdrawal through the CS barrier and consequently no friendly troops were required for that sector.

b. During the five day period that four CIDG Companies were employed within area BERTT, the brigade attached artillery forward observers and engineer demolition personnel to these units. The FO's proved quite valuable as two of the companies became heavily engaged and required artillery support. Another advantage of having artillery personnel with the CIDG units was that of communications. At times the CIDG companies were out of communications with their parent unit and the Fire Direction Net of the FO's was utilized to pass important traffic. The engineers were utilized to destroy VC fortifications and bunkers and improved landing zones.

c. Liaison parties headed by a field grade officer (Major) were dispatched to both the ARVN and ROK Battalions while they were conducting operations with the brigade. This system proved most advantageous as coordination between these units and the brigade was excellent throughout the operation. On several occasions the brigade was able to provide resources that the

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non U.S. Battalions did not possess such as ARV and TAC Air.

15. COMMANDERS COMMENTS:

- a. The operation was triggered by a solid intelligence report from a CIDG Camp. We need more reports such as this.
- b. The terrain in the operational area was different and demanding. It curtailed somewhat our airmobile capabilities. Yet I feel that a different type unit would find the terrain more taxing.
- c. The Korean battalion performed airmobile operations exceptionally well.
- d. When operating with ARVN and other FMRF, well qualified liaison parties with adequate communications are an absolute necessity.
- e. The psy-ops talking helicopter capability requires refinement and more responsive availability.
- f. The chemical barrier concept has merit; it should be tested, evaluated and standardized.
- g. CIDG Companies can assist operations significantly but their limited combat capability must always be considered.
- h. The CRAZY HORSE area is an excellent training ground, offering challenges to everyone supported and everyone supporting. Battalion operations should be scheduled periodically in the CRAZY HORSE area.
- i. A permanent Special Forces or ARVN installation should be established in the southern portion of the KIM SON Valley or all the population be evacuated and the area laid waste. Many inhabitants of the area expressed a strong desire to live under RVN Government control, however they currently have no choice but to support the VC who control the area.

FOR THE COMMANDER

John W. Summers
 RONALD K SUMMERS
 Major, Infantry
 Adjutant

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Annex B. (Lessons Learned), to After Action Report, CRAZY HORSE.

1. Riot Control Agents.

a. General: Riot Control Agents (CS) were employed as an economy of force measure to provide a barrier approximately five (5) kilometers long over a densely vegetated, mountainous area during the conduct of the operation.

b. Recommendations. The use of Riot Control Agents to provide a barrier to enemy withdrawal should be tested and evaluated under controlled conditions to determine the value of the technique. These tests should include various types of terrain and vegetation.

2. Fire Control.

a. General. A considerable period of valuable time is required for squad and fire team leaders to organize and direct the fires of their elements during a sudden fire-fight.

b. Recommendations. That two magazines of M-16 tracer ammunition be carried by fire team and squad leaders so that they can direct the fires of their men.

3. Interdictory Fires.

a. General. The VC will usually attempt to break contact and withdraw once he is engaged. Many times the main body of the VC force will withdraw leaving behind a rear guard which continues the fight until the main body is clear of the area.


b. Recommendations. That interdictory fires be instituted along all possible routes of VC withdrawal immediately after contact is established.

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INCLOSURE #1 (TRAILS)
TO "CRAZY HORSE"
AFTER ACTION REPORT



ACKNOWLEDGE

HENNESSEY
COL




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


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
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





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









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
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


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
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


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